Helping the Police to Police Themselves

SAPS National Commissioner Jackie Selebi, is known for making off the cuff remarks. It is therefore not clear what should be made of Selebi's remarks, to the select committee on security last week, where he is reported to have motivated for the closing down of South Africa's key police oversight body, the Independent Complaints Directorate.

Selebi is reported to have said that police sometimes made mistakes but that there was no need for a special organisation to investigate them, partly as the SAPS has an evaluation services division for dealing with improper police action.

Selebi's remarks feed into a climate of uncertainty following remarks made by Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula in April last year about intentions to 'consolidate' the ICD and the Secretariat for Safety and Security.

With the Minister now due to address the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security on this issues on 7 June what is of concern is a broad lack of understanding amongst role players in policing in South Africa in relation to the purpose of oversight bodies like the ICD and their role in preventing and control police criminality.

Policing is a high risk occupation in relation to the potential for unlawful conduct. Not only are police prone to abuse their power to use force but police powers and responsibilities also generate a wide range of opportunities for corrupt behaviour. This is reflected in South Africa where surveys indicate that police are widely regarded as the government agencies most affected by corruption.

Pollice organisations are also often very bad at controlling corruption and other unlawful conduct by their members. Police officers often prefer to turn a blind eye to the improper conduct on the part of their colleagues partly because policing in many ways functions through a culture of solidarity in which members depend on each other for back up.

Internal policing investigation units have often been ineffective as they are often also subject to the same cultural pressures that affect other police officers. Oversight bodies such as the Independent Complaints Directorate are therefore usually established as a response to the problem of the lack of effectiveness of internal investigative bodies.

But the key nuance which has never been integrated into the debate on police oversight in South Africa is that oversight bodies should not take the place of internal police units. Rather they should be designed, and empowered, to serve as a check on these units, a guarantee that internal investigations are being conducted in terms of acceptable standards.

What is recognised in other countries is that, once the proper environment is established, internal policing units are potentially more effective in investigating alleged abuses by police members. Factors which help to create an environment for proper internal investigations include an external oversight body which can check that internal investigations are being properly conducted, and support from police leadership for the establishment of effective internal investigations.

This is one of the major policy errors which has been made by the ICD itself. Instead of ensuring that police are dealing with complaints and internal problems of criminality effectively, the ICD has put itself forward as the first point of contact for members of the public who have complaints against the police. As a result the ICD has set itself up to fail, having developed a massive backlog of cases, thus reinforcing the inadequacies of existing systems for dealing with police malfeasance.

It must be said that the inadequacies of the ICD's response to these problems has been complemented by the police. One of the first actions which distinguished Selebi's watch as National Commissioner was the closure of the SAPS anti-corruption unit, at the time the most effective component of the SAPS internal investigation system.

Since that point the whole issue of internal investigations has been neglected partly it seems as it runs counter to the determination of the SAPS to close down all specialised unit.

But whatever the motivation for closing down other units, one thing that is clearly demonstrated by international experience is that police must have strong internal investigative systems if they are to tackle improper conduct and create an internal culture of integrity. The current evaluation services division can not be seen as fulfilling this need.

Any careful consideration of the current issues in this arena therefore highlights the need for strengthening and more clearly defining the role of the Independent Complaints Directorate as well as beginning to develop better internal investigation systems within the SAPS.

What is needed therefore is a comprehensive review of internal and oversight systems for the investigation and control of police misconduct.

Despite being seen as one of the leading international examples of successful democratic police reform, this is one area in which South Africa, and the SAPS, are lagging far behind.

David Bruce is a Senior Researcher in the Criminal Justice Programme at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Originally published in Business Day, 22 May 2006.

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